Orleans County Monitor, Barton, VT, April 10, 1899
Not the least interesting part of Admiral Sampson’s paper on “The Atlantic Fleet in the Spanish War,” in the April Century, is that in which he critises the Spanish Commander’s strategy.
When we come to consider the strategy of Admiral Cevera in leaving the harbor, it must be said first of all that it would have been much better, if he could have done so to leave at ‘ night. That he could not do so, is the testimony of officers of his fleet. We know from what they said subsequently, while they were prisoners that this plan had been considered by the admiral and his officers. Two advocated going out by night; the others were all in favor of the sortie by day. The great difficulty in a night attempt was our dazzling search-light. A search-light shining direct in one’s eyes prevents him absolutely from seeing anything else; it is as though he were looking at the sun; and it was that effect upon them taken in connection with the necessity of seeing their way out of the channel, that made them hesitate. This feeling was in itself a compliment to the efficiency of the blockade, but we did not attach so much importance to the dazzling of the enemy as to the illumination of the channel so that we could see everything that was going on. It was a continual wonder to us why they did not fire at our search-light, which was always within range. To be sure, it would have required pretty good marksmanship to knock it out, but it would have made the man who was manipulating it quite uneasy to know that he was the center of the enemy’s fire.
The enemy had no search-lights at their defenses. All the necessary machinery was in place for the establishment of one at Socapa, but they never got so far as to complete the plant and actually use it.
What appeared to us the most favorable chance for Cevera was to have prepared to come out with a full head of steam, and then to have chosen a very cloudy, dark night, or one when a dense rain or squall was passing over the harbor, when it would be very difficult to see in any circumstances, and, guided by screened lights placed along the channel for the purpose, to have made for the open sea. His ships might have run out of such a storm in about an hour; so long as the squall continued they probably could could have counted upon being invisible to a great extent. It would have been difficult to identify the particular ships, and in the confusion and darkness they would probably so far have escaped observation that they might have been out of sight by the time the weather cleared up or the squall had passed. There were several such nights, and very anxious ones they were for us.
Dismissing the question of a sortie by night, there were several things be might have done by day: (1) to take the course he did along shore to the westward ; (2) to take a similar course to the eastward; (3) to divide his fleet between the two courses; and (4) to scatter through our fleet. When they all came out and started along the beach, our fire was easily concentrated on them. It would have been worse to go eastward, as he would have had to engage not only all the vessels he did, but the New York and the vessels at Guantanamo the Massachusetts, Newark and Marblehead, which could have been notified by telegraph. He might have made a feint to go in a certain direction. Two ships sent in one direction would probably have called out most of the strength of our vessels, and have given his others a better chance than they had. What would have happened if they had boldly attempted to dash through the fleet can only be a matter of speculation. Thero could hardly have been so much concentration of fire upon them and in the smoke and confusion some of them might have got through. They had simply to encounter the same kind of fire; at the beginning it might have been heavier. I suppose the result would not have been different. If any one of them had succeeded in breaking through, her speed would have given her a chance of escape. We had only three ships that were faster than theirs. As it was, they left the Indiana and Iowa behind in a short time, and if they had been running straight to sea, those ships could have followed them no longer than they did, the Indiana eight or ten miles, the Iowa eighteen, so that they would have only the same number of ships following them, if they had got through. The fact is, they hugged the shore as a possible means of rescue in case of disaster; they did not like to leave the land entirely.