January 22, 1861 – The Pensacola Forts

Colored Currier & Ives lithograph of Fort Pickens

The Daily Exchange, Baltimore, MD

Popular interest in warlike movements now centres nearer at home than when Charleston was the only point from which radiated the war excitements of the day. The immediate interest of at least three States—Mississippi, Alabama and Florida, is now becoming alive to the importance of occupying the forts within the borders of the latter Commonwealth. We see repeated at Pensacola, the manoeuvre of Anderson at Moultrie. There are three forts at Pensacola, a Navy Yard and a redoubt. Commandant Armstrong has abandoned the Navy Yard and Fort Barancas, removing munitions and spiking guns, and transferring his forces, amounting in the aggregate to between two and three hundred men, from the main land to Santa Rosa Island, has prepared to make good his position within the-immensely strong fortifications of Fort Pickens. Whether he has abandoned Fort McCree, also, we are not advised, but we doubt if he has. This fortress is a powerful and castle-like masonry erection, built on a low sand-spit of the main land, and appearing to rise out of the water. It is further seaward than Fort Pickens, of which it is the vis-a vis across the channel, and a vessel entering must needs run the gauntlet of its guns before approaching the latter, which, however, of itself, effectually closes the harbor against the admission of an enemy of even very heavy force.

Fort Pickens is designed to mount no less than two hundred and twelve guns, and under the protection of its immense batteries the ships of an enemy could make good their harbor in the Bay of Pensacola, or if they did not care to run the risk from shore batteries which could not he in very dangerous range, they could land forces and supplies on the Fort to the eastward on Santa Rosa Island, which is some forty miles long, and thus throw in reinforcements and rendezvous even an army at the Fort without interruption, unless of a force entrenched on the island itself, in the rear of the fort—which, however, is almost if not quite as defensible from rear as front. If we are to have war. the seizure of this stronghold is, of course, of the first importance, for unless it is occupied by us it will secure to the enemy a base of operations along our whole gulf coast, and keep open a road right into the heart of the South, which cannot be obstructed by any fixed fortifications. Once within the gates of the harbor, and an army could be disembarked at any point on the wide bay which it might select. It could run up beyond the Escambia river and land many hours ahead of any opposing force which might be at Pensacola, beside placing a wide river between it and the latter—or even two rivers, the Escambia and Black water—by going far enough up. Hence, with a start of at least forty eight hours, it could march into interior Alabama. An enemy holding Fort Pickens could rendezvous a naval force there and keep up a blockade of all the ports of the Gulf, unless we could meet it on the sea.

News from Washington of the position of the Administration should very soon advise us whether the risk of bloodshed is to be incurred in seizing Fort Pickens, or whether we shall find reason to delay the alternative of appeal to that terrible dernier resort in a fair prospect of peaceful cession. If it is to be seized by direct power of arms it will not be by a force coming under its guns from the water approach. It must be stormed by a sudden attack from a heavy force concentrated on the island to the eastward, which will take it with a Zouave-like rush in double-quick time—pouring into it in such numbers as to at once overpower every chance of resistance on the part of the garrison. Though done in the night, and with the quickest movement, and though escaping loss from the batteries in the approach, the work at the walls will be a bloody business if the garrison have a mind to make it so. The commander has committed the same act of hostility that Anderson did at Moultrie, but we do believe that he will soon surrender the fort, as the commandant at Baton Rouge did the arsenal, on the grounds of the presence of an overwhelming force and the plea of avoiding useless bloodshedding. He is reported to have said he would not fire on his countrymen. We do not believe that he will.— Mobile Advertiser, 15th.

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